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1	 Introduction	
	
Soft		law		refers		to		a		deviation		from		hard		law		that		begins		with		the		weakening		of		legal	
arrangements		‘along		one		or		more		of		the		dimensions		of		obligation,		precision,		and	
delegation’.1		Such		a		weakening		of		legal		arrangements		is		considered		potentially	
beneficial.	
Soft	legalization	...		 provides	certain	benefits	not	available	under	hard	legalization.	It	offers	
more	effective	ways	to	deal	with	uncertainty,	especially	when	it	initiates	processes	that	
allow	actors	to	leant	about	the	impact	of	agreements	over	time.	In	addition,	soft	law	
facilitates	compromise,	and	thus	mutually	beneficial	cooperation,	between	actors	with	
different	interests	and	values,	different	time	horizons	and	discount	rates,	and	different	
degrees	of	power.2	
A		gradual		conceptual		shift		away		from		mandatory		regulation		has		been		evident	
over		the		past		few		decades3		on		the		basis		that:		‘soft		law		offers		many		of		the		advantages	
of		hard		law,		avoids		some		of		the		costs		of		hard		law,		and		has		certain		independent	
advantages		of		its		own.’4		The		Global		Compact		asks		that		companies		voluntarily	
‘embrace,		support		and		enact’		internationally		recognized		standards’,		while		the	
2002		EU		Green		Paper		on		Corporate		Social		Responsibility		broadly		relies		on		a	
‘concept		whereby		companies		integrate		social		and		environmental		concerns		in		their	
	
	
	
'Abbott	and	Snidal	(2000),	p.	422.	
2Abbott	and	Snidal	(2000),	p.	422.	
3Macleod	and	Lewis	(2004),	p.	2.	
4Macleod	and	Lewis	(2004),	p.	422.	
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business		operations		and		in		their		interaction		with		their		stakeholders		on		a		voluntary	
basis.’5	
However,		it		could		be		argued		that		a		strong		reliance		on		self-regulation		has		failed		to	
create		conditions		to		forestall		ongoing		corporate		governance		crises,		including		the	
2007		financial		crisis.6		Moreover,		specific		instantiations		of		soft		law,		like		the		UK	
Corporate		Governance		Code		(hereafter:		the		UK		Code),		which		serves		as		a		model		for	
‘soft		law’		approaches		to		corporate		governance		worldwide,		have		been		critiqued		for	
four		main		reasons:	
1.		While		the		UK		Code		explicitly		argues		against		mandatory		legislation,		this		takes	
place		in		a		context		in		which		suasion		exercised		by		business		and		regulatory		elites		is	
considered		the		implicit		backdrop.		The		explicit		reliance		on		self-regulation		in		the	
UK		Code		is		thus		framed		by		a		trust		in		the		capacity		of		strong		informal		institutions	
to		provide		compliance.		As		this		context		remains		implicit		in		the		Code,		spreading	
assumptions		of		self-regulation		beyond		the		UK		might		have		unintended		conse-	
quences		in		jurisdictions		with		different		regulatory		institutions		and		with		different	
ownership		and		control		structures		for		public		companies.	
2.		Although		the		UK		Code		adopts		a		self-regulatory		regime		based		on		the		capacity		for	
informal		suasion,		this		approach		seems		to		fail		in		the		face		of		non-compliance		with	
respect		to		the		comply		or		explain		regime		and		with		regard		to		the		exercise		of	
sufficient		self-constraint		in		the		face		of		major		irritants		to		the		broader		public		like	
rising		executive		pay.		This		adds		a		problematic		empirical		aspect		to		consider		with	
regard		to		the		adoption		of		self-regulation.	
3.		The		discourse		of		the		UK		Code		entrenches		a		notion		of		political		economy		that	
projects		a		problematic		shareholder		value-oriented		compass		for		corporate		gover-	
nance.		This		compass		creates		a		set		of		institutional		conditions		that		makes		it		largely	
illusory		to		rely		on		boards		or		market		agents		to		provide		adequate		protection		for	
other		constituencies’		interests		or		to		provide		a		long-term		perspective		to		compa-	
nies.		As		such,		the		UK		Code		exports		a		model		for		self-regulation		into		corporate	
governance		codes		worldwide		that		protects		specific		notions		of		political		economy.	
4.		Self-regulatory		codes		like		the		UK		Code		conceptualise		corporations		as		entities	
that,		in		principle,		operate		as		integrated		entities		‘under		the		law’		that		can		be	
directly		monitored.		As		the		evasive		nature		of		transnational		corporations		(TNCs)	
remains		opaque,		this		leaves		TNCs		free		to		operate		in		a		transnational		domain,	
while		it		puts		regulatory		bodies		at		a		distinct		disadvantage.	
Overall,		it		can		be		argued		that		the		use		of		the		UK		Code		as		a		blueprint		for		the	
development		of		corporate		governance		codes		based		on		self-regulation		in		a		transna-	
tional		domain		facilitates		the		spread		of		highly		specific		corporate		governance	
arrangements		without		a		proper		sense		of		their		effects		in		other		jurisdictions.		To	
engage		with		these		issues		in		a		consistent		way,		ideas		of		corporate		governance		need	
to		be		contextualized		and		diversified		to		a		far		greater		degree		in		the		transnational	
	
	
sMacleod	and	Lewis	(2004),	p.	9.	
6Veldman	and	Willmott	(2016).
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domain.		At		the		same		time,		the		status		of		and		relative		relations		between		concepts		like	
citizens,		states,		TNCs,		and		non-govemment		organisations		(NGOs)		in		a		transna-	
tional		regulatory		domain		need		to		be		more		closely		scrutinised		and		understood.	
I		will		start		by		exploring		the		UK		Code		of		Governance		as		a		model		for		the		spread		of	
notions		of		self-regulation		into		Codes		of		corporate		governance		worldwide.		I		will	
then		briefly		discuss		some		limitations		and		problems		of		the		UK		Code,		arguing		that		it	
implicitly		operates		on		the		basis		of		suasion;		that		its		assumptions		have		not		been	
re-shaped		on		the		basis		of		empirical		refutation;		that		it		embeds		a		specific		type		of	
political		economy;		and		that		it		conceptualises		corporations		as		integrated		and		ulti-	
mately		controllable		entities,		thereby		ignoring		the		status		of		TNCs		operating		in		a	
transnational		domain.	
	
	
2	 The		UK		Code		of		Corporate		Governance:		An	
International		Example	
	
‘Corporate		governance’		refers		to		the		way		in		which		(public)		corporations		are		struc-	
tured		and		administrated.		More		specifically,		the		theory		and		practice		of		corporate	
governance		defines		how		value		created		by		public		corporations		is		created		and		divided	
by		setting		the		conditions		for		the		relations		between		the		corporate		entity		and		its	
stakeholders,		such		as		shareholders,		creditors,		boards,		managers,		workers,		and	
other		stakeholders,		such		as		communities,		trade		unions,		and		the		state.7		Therefore	
an		understanding		of		corporate		governance		has		a		direct		impact		on		the		way		contem-	
porary		economies		function.8	
Corporate		governance		codes		play		a		central		role		in		how		corporate		governance	
theory		becomes		embedded		and		institutionalised.9		Although		it		was		not		the		first		Code	
to		be		issued,10		the		impact		of		the		Cadbury		Report—the		first		instantiation		of		the		UK	
Code—‘cannot		be		overstated’11		as		it		‘sparked		a		debate		on		good		governance		that	
resulted		in		the		rapid		introduction		of		codes		in		other		countries’12		and		is		currently	
‘widely		regarded		as		an		international		benchmark		for		good		corporate		governance	
practice’.13	
The		Cadbury		Report		sparked		a		debate		on		corporate		governance		in		response		to		a	
longer		history		of		concern		by		institutional		actors		(in		particular		the		Financial	
Reporting		Council		(FRC),		the		London		Stock		Exchange		(LSE),		and		the		Institute		of	
	
	
7Aglietta	and	Reberioux	(2005)	and	Tricker	(2015).	
8Ireland	(2005)	and	Jansson	et	al.	(2016).	
9Veldman	and	Willmott	(2016).	
l0Aguilera	and	Cuervo-Cazurra	(2009):	The	first	code	of	corporate	governance	was	issued	in	the	
USA	in	1978,	the	second	came	from	Hong	Kong	in	1989	and	Ireland	came	third	in	1991.	
11	Jones	and	Pierce	(2013),	p.	31.	
l2Aguilera	and	Cuervo-Cazurra	(2009),	p.	378.	
l3Arcot	et	al.	(2010).
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Chartered		Accountants		in		England		and		Wales		(ICAEW))		about		inadequate		board-	
level		controls		over		management		and		a		string		of		corporate		scandals		between		1989	
and		1991,		which		put		into		question		the		capacity		of		the		accounting		profession		to	
provide		adequate		transparency		and		of		financial		markets		to		provide		adequate		mon-	
itoring		to		limit		fraud		and		failure.14		In		response		to		concerns		about		the		legitimacy		of	
the		accounting		profession,		market		monitoring		and		private		regulation,		the		FRC;	
LSE;		and		the		ICAEW		established		the		Committee		on		the		Financial		Aspects		of	
Corporate		Governance,		chaired		by		Sir		Adrian		Cadbury.15		Against		the		historical	
background,		the		mandate		for		this		committee		was		to		propose		a		remedy		that		would	
re-legitimate		the		accountancy		profession		and		market		monitoring,		while		keeping	
mandatory		regulation		at		bay		and		keep		corporate		governance		a		private		and		voluntary	
matter.		Through		the		patronage		of		its		business		and		government		sponsors,		the	
Cadbury		Code		and		the		large		number		of		updates		and		reviews		that		would		together	
make		up		the		UK		Code		of		Corporate		Governance		would		eventually		become		a		central	
part		of		the		UK		corporate		governance		system		and		a		formal		part		of		the		listing	
requirements		for		the		LSE.16	
The		Cadbury		Report		argued		that		mandatory		regulation		is		counter-productive,	
both		in		terms		of		acceptance		and		uptake,		and		in		terms		of		business		results		with		the	
argument		that		it		‘shackles’		corporate		activity,		distorts		or		constrains		the		effective	
operation		of		markets,		and		defeats		the		purpose		of		identifying		best		practices		to		be	
emulated.17		In		response,		a		bespoke		approach		that		offers		‘...		flexibility		and		intelli-	
gent		discretion		and		allows		for		valid		exception		to		the		sound		rule.’18		would		become		a	
hallmark		of		the		UK		Code.		To		assuage		fears		that		the		Code		could		be		perceived		by	
companies		as		‘sets		of		prescriptive		rules’19		or		that		it		would		become		a		‘one		size		fits	
all’		approach,		it		is		consistently		made		clear		that		the		Code		is		not		meant		to		be		rigid		and	
that		harder		regulation		is		counterproductive		as		it		fosters		‘tick-box’		behaviour.20	
Change		is		perceived		to		come		from		ongoing		adjustments		to		corporate		strategy		by	
boards		on		the		basis		of		an		ongoing		and		active		process		of		reflection		on		the		spirit		of		the	
Code		and		the		identification		and		dissemination		of		‘best		practice’		in		corporate	
governance.		It		is		assumed		that		if		these		processes		fail		to		provide		sufficient		nudges,	
the		‘comply		or		explain’		procedure		will		provide		sufficient		transparency		and		account-	
ability		for		vigilant		market		agents		to		act		on.21		As		the		objective		is		recognition		and	
	
l4Spira	and	Slinn	(2013).	
l5Sir	Adrian	Cadbury,	knighted	in	1977,	was	Chairman	of	Cadbury	Schweppes	from	1965	until	
1989	before	becoming	a	Director	of	the	Bank	of	England	from	1970	to	1994.	
l6Spira	and	Slinn	(2013)	and	Jones	and	Pollitt	(2004),	p.	10.	
l7Cadbury	Committee,	1.9.	
lsArcot	and	Bruno	(2006),	p.	2.	
l9Hampel	Report	(1998),	p.	7.	
20Arcot	and	Bruno	(2006),	Pye	(2013),	FRCUK	(2012)	and	Roberts	and	Clarke	(2012).	
2'Although	the	Code	is	formally	a	part	of	the	Listing	Requirement	of	the	LSE,	this	element	of	
quasi-compulsion	has	always	been	considered	the	'nuclear	option’	and	has	never	been	used	(Spira	
and	Slinn	2013;	Varotill	2017	-	this	volume).	As	such	it	is	a	formal	requirement,	but	presents	an	
idle	threat.	(Parkinson	2000,	p.	262).
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explanation		of		practices		by		boardroom		members		which		exceed,		or		fall		short		of,	
‘best		practice’22		it		is		acceptable,		and		indeed		it		is		expected,		that		deviations		from		the	
Code		will		occur		and		that		these		will		be		accompanied		by		an		explanation		(hence	
‘comply		or		explain’).		Against		this		background,		the		UK		Code		explicitly		champions	
non-statutory		solutions		to		corporate		governance		issues,23		particularly		disclosure,	
and		depends		on		voluntary		compliance		by		boards		and		market		agents.24	
The		UK		Code		provided		a		model		for		international		corporate		governance		codes	
that		came		after		it25:		‘Nearly		every		corporate		governance		development		in		the		UK	
and		throughout		the		world		in		the		past		two		decades		has		derived		much		of		its		content	
and		inspiration		from		the		Cadbury		Report’.26		Even		though		the		US,		particularly		after	
Sarbanes-Oxley,		developed		a		more		mandatory		rules-based		system27		and		although	
recent		developments		in		the		EU,		like		Directive		2014/95/EU28		may		also		spell		a		move	
away		from		a		comply		or		explain		approach,		the		principles-based		UK		Code		of	
Corporate		Governance		continues		to		serve		as		a		model		for		the		development		of	
codes		of		corporate		governance		outside		the		UK.		In		sum,		it		can		be		argued		that		the	
soft		law		‘comply		or		explain		approach		to		corporate		governance		developed		in		the		UK	
Code		has		become		regarded		as		the		‘best		practice’		of		corporate		governance		in		the	
EU29		and		worldwide.30		As		such,		it		has		provided		the		basis		for		a		‘more		general		global	
governance		model’31		and		a		worldwide		conceptual		convergence32		on		standards		for	
corporate		governance		in		a		remarkably		short		period		of		time		during		the		1990s		and		the	
early		2000s.33	
	
	
	
	
	
	
22Cadbury	Report	(1992),	3.10.	
23Parkinson	and	Kelly	(1999),	p.	102.	
24Cadbury	Report	(1992),	1.10.	
“Backed	by	transnational	institutions	such	as	the	World	Bank,	OECD,	IMF	and	the	EU	(Aguilera	
and	Cuervo-Cazurra	(2009),	Horn	(2012),	Overbeek	et	al.	(2007),	but	also	through	the	WTO	and	
the	Basle	Accords	(Morgan	(2008),	p.	641).	64	countries	had	issued	a	total	of	196	codes	by	
mid-2008	(Aguilera	and	Cuervo-Cazurra	2009,	p.	376).	
2SJones	and	Pierce	(2013),	p.	31;	see	also	Aguilera	and	Cuervo-Cazurra	(2004,	2009).	
“Tricker	(2015)	and	Varotill	(2017).	
28http://ec.europa.eu/finance/company-reporting/non-financial_reporting/index_en.htm.	
29Keay	(2014),	p.	282.	
“Henry	(2008),	p.	400;	Jordan	(2013),	p.	9,	26;	Varotill	(2017).	
3'Aguilera	and	Cuervo-Cazurra	(2009),	p.	381.	
'2‘Convergence’...	can	be	described	as	the	way	in	which	a	series	of	actions	are	driven	towards	a	
central	point	of	reference.	Convergence	is	a	process	towards	a	common	set	of	principles	and	
objectives	...		 The	word	is	currently	used	in	the	process	of	convergence	between	US	Generally	
Accepted	Accounting	Principles	(US	GAAP)	and	IFRS.	The	process	aims	at	analysing	the	
standards	of	each	of	the	systems	and	deciding	the	best	standard.	Ugeux	(2004),	p.	341.	
33Ugeux	(2004).	
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3	 The		UK		Code		and		Self-Regulation	
	
The		fact		that		the		UK		Code		has		acted		as		a		blueprint		and		spread		assumptions		of		self-	
regulation		into		codes		all		over		the		world,		invites		a		critical		survey		of		the		way		the		UK	
Code		functions		and		the		possible		consequences		of		the		spread		of		these		assumptions.	
	
	
3.1	 Institutionalisation		and		Regulation	
	
It		has		been		argued		that		‘soft		law’		appears		as		arrangements		including		principles,	
voluntary		codes,		practices,		and		standards		that		are		not		an		absence		of		law,		but		rather	
present		many		types		of		alternative		conceptions		of		control.34		In		the		case		of		the		UK	
Code,		we		find		that		the		UK’s		pattern		of		enforcement		has		a		distinctly		informal		hue.	
Regulation		formally		takes		place		through		public		agencies,		but		‘the		lion’s		share		of		the	
interventions		by		the		relevant		agencies—the		Takeover		Panel,		the		Financial	
Reporting		Review		Panel,		and		the		Financial		Services		Authority—is		of		an		informal	
character,		not		resulting		in		any		legal		action’.		As		‘strong		informal		private		enforce-	
ment		has		historically		therefore		been		the		flipside,		in		the		UK,		of		weak		formal		private	
enforcement’		and		as		‘suasion,		rather		than		sanction,		is		the		order		of		the		day’,35		it	
makes		sense		that		formal		private		enforcement		plays		little		or		no		role		in		controlling	
managers,		and		shareholder		lawsuits		are		conspicuous		by		their		absence.36	
The		UK		Code		can		be		understood		as		the		continuation		of		a		specific		approach		to	
regulation:	
even	prior	to	the	Cadbury	Code,	a	standing	example	of	a	self-regulatory	code	has	been	the	
City	Code	on	Takeovers	and	Mergers	to	establish	a	flexible	mechanism	...		 with	‘soft’	
powers	of	enforcement	such	as	‘cold-shouldering’,	which	strike	at	the	heart	of	the	reputa-	
tion	of	various	players	in	the	takeover	market	...		 the	erstwhile	practice	of	relying	on	
voluntary	compliance	by	various	market	players	largely	continues.3	’	
The		UK		Code		can		also		be		understood		as		an		approach		to		regulation		that		is	
preferred		by		particular		types		of		agents38:		‘the		role		of		a		small		community		of	
institutional		investors,		who		interacted		frequently		with		one		another		and		with	
investee		firms,		facilitated		the		establishment		of		self-regulatory		bodies		and		lobbied	
for		rules		that		protected		shareholder		entitlements		and		have		gradually		been		put		upon		a	
	
	
34See	Gopalan,	this	volume.	
35Armour	(2008),	p.	2.	
36See	also	Armour	et	al.	(2009)	and	Varotill	(2017).	
37Varotill	(2017).	
3sVarottil	similarly	argues	that	‘...	a	voluntary	approach	has	been	orchestrated	in	the	UK	by	its	
large	and	influential	pool	of	institutional	investors’	who	‘...	preferred	a	voluntary	mechanism	for	
regulating	their	affairs	as	well	as	those	of	the	companies	in	which	they	invested’	and	who	saw	'the	
use	of	a	voluntary	code	of	conduct...	as	an	effective	method	to	forestall	more	stringent	mandatory	
rules.’	(Varotill	2017).
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formal		legal		basis,		such		that		they		are		now		public		agencies.		This		has		led		to		a		situation	
where		‘their		approach		to		enforcement		still		retains		much		of		the		informality		and		focus	
on		reputation		that		characterised		self-regulation.’39		In		a		context		where		reliance		is	
placed		on		control		that		is		typically		exercised		behind		the		scenes,		and		the		capacity		of	
business		elites		to		adopt		best		practices		and		reflect		on		the		spirit		of		a		Code,		the		reliance	
and		focus		on		self-regulation		in		the		UK		Code		of		corporate		governance		can		be	
understood		in		relation		to		a		belief		that		particular		agents,		notably		government		agents	
and		institutional		investors,		are		best		placed		to		provide		effective		guidance		to		business	
elites		through		informal		means.40		In		this		context,		the		Code’s		explicit		argument	
against		mandatory		legislation,		the		explicit		reliance		on		self-regulation		and		the		belief	
in		the		capacity		of		anonymous		market		actors		to		provide		monitoring		and		control		can	
be		related		to		the		trust		that		is		placed		in		the		capacity		of		strong		informal		institutions		to	
provide		monitoring		and		compliance,		notably		through		suasion		and		peer		pressure		by	
business		and		regulatory		elites.41	42	
It		may		be		argued		that		this		implicit		reliance		on		informal		institutions		is		problem-	
atic		in		an		international		context		for		two		reasons.		Firstly,		the		overall		necessity		for		the	
presence		of		strong		institutions		to		deal		with		corporate		governance		issues		is		clear.		As	
Varottil		argues:	
a	market-oriented	approach	would	function	effectively	only	if	it	is	supported	by	a	system	of	
legal	institutions	and	mechanisms	with	strong	foundations.	These	include	a	robust	company	
law	(such	as	fiduciary	duties	imposed	on	directors)	and	an	efficient	enforcement	mechanism	
through	courts.	The	presence	of	sophisticated	market	players	and	gatekeepers	such	as	
independent	directors,	auditors	and	compliance	professionals	will	ensure	third-party	mon-	
itoring	as	a	means	to	ensure	enhanced	corporate	governance.,42	
What		we		find		in		the		UK		context		is		that		the		type		of		self-regulation		presented		in		the	
UK		Code		is		explicitly		premised		on		self-regulation,		but		mitigated		by		the		presence		of	
strong		formal		institutions		and		by		a		reliance		on		the		effectiveness		of		informal		suasion.	
If		it		is		not		clear		that		notions		of		self-regulation		are		mitigated		in		these		ways,		they		may	
well		have		unwanted		effects		in		other		jurisdictions.		Secondly,		as		the		principles-based	
UK		code		increasingly		presents		the		dominant		model		for		‘good’		corporate		gover-	
nance		and		‘best		practice’,		and		as		such		notions		of		‘best		practice’		increasingly		come	
to		permeate		benchmarks		for		capital		market		actors		and		insurers,		regulators		and	
standard		setters		in		other		jurisdictions		are		increasingly		faced		with		the		necessity		to	
adopt		the		‘comply		or		explain’		approach		and		the		soft		law		assumptions		it		represents,	
irrespective		of		their		particular		assumptions		about		regulation,		and		irrespective		of		its	
applicability		to		their		jurisdictional		ownership		and		control		structures.43		However,	
	
	
39Armour	(2008),	p.	61.	
40Within	the	 UK,	 reliance	 on	 such	 behind-the	 scenes	 arrangements	 is	 increasingly	 being	
questioned,	particularly	in	the	light	of	the	changing	composition	of	ownership	and	control	in	the	
UK	as	a	result	of	increasing	foreign	ownership	(see	Tsagas	2014).	
41Arcot	et	al.	(2010),	p.	200;	see	also	Van	Bekkum	et	al.	(2010),	p.	29.	
42Varotill	(2017).	
43Larsson-01aison	(2014)	and	Varotill	(2017).
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the		UK		Code		is		premised		on		very		specific		notions		of		ownership,		board		structures,	
and		control.		These		notions		include		dispersed		shareholding;		a		separation		between	
ownership		and		control;		a		unitary		board		structure		and		well-functioning		capital	
market		controls.	
Using		these		assumptions		in		relation		to		other		shareholding		and		control		models	
may		well		have		unwanted		consequences.		Varottil		argues		that		‘companies		with	
concentrated		shareholding		are		less		likely		to		promote		voluntary		disclosure		due		to	
their		ability		to		generate		private		information		and		benefits’		and		that		‘the		incidence		of	
non-compliance		with		voluntary		norms		[are]		greater		among		firms		owned		by		business	
families,		founders		or		heirs.’		This		leads		him		to		argue		that		because		the		UK		Code		puts	
‘little		emphasis		...			on		the		equitable		treatment		of		different		groups		of		shareholders’		it	
is		‘not		tailor-made		to		a		context		where		dominant		shareholders,		e.g.		promoters,	
control		management		and		where		the		corporate		governance		problem		is		chiefly		one	
of		the		protection		of		minority		shareholder		rights.’44	45		In		fact,		using		the		assumptions	
underlying		the		UK		Code		in		blockholder-controlled		systems		may		well		be		counter-	
productive,		as		‘opacity		without		mandatory		rules		is		likely		to		adversely		affect		the	
interests		of		minority		shareholders.,4j		Similarly,		there		is		evidence		to		suggest		that	
companies		under		strong		managerial		control		and		with		limited		minority		shareholder	
influence		provide		an		ownership		structure		that		allows		managers		‘not		to		commit	
themselves		to		transparency		requirements’		if		they		have		incentives		to		do		so.46		Con-	
sequently,		commentators		have		argued		that		in		jurisdictions		like		Sweden,		India		and	
Hong		Kong,		regulators		merely		pay		lip		service		and		show		outward		compliance		to		the	
UK		model,		as		this		is		necessary		in		order		to		secure		continuing		access		to		international	
capital		markets.		In		practice,		however,		they		will		tweak		the		(informal)		understanding	
of		and		compliance		regime		for		corporate		governance		codes		in		their		jurisdictions		in	
such		a		way		that		they		are		better		suited		for		the		conditions		in		their		own		jurisdictions.47	
	
	
3.2	 Empirical		Issues		and		Political		Economy	
	
Basing		corporate		governance		codes		worldwide		on		ideas		of		self-regulation		may		be	
problematic,		but		the		trust		placed		in		these		informal		institutions		in		the		UK		is		arguably	
just		as		problematic.		When		the		Cadbury		Report		was		presented,		it		was		understood	
that		it		was		a		rather		urgent		attempt		to		restore		public		confidence		in		self-regulation		by	
boards,		the		accounting		sector,		and		market		actors.48		In		this		context,		it		is		interesting		to	
note		that		reflection		on		the		‘spirit’,		rather		than		the		letter		of		the		Code,		is,		at		best,	
lacklustre.		It		has		been		reported		that		the		Code		has		been		met		with		‘creative	
	
	
44Varotill	(2017).	
45Varotill	(2017).	
46Andres	and	Theissen	(2008)	and	Arcot	et	al.	(2010).	
47Larsson-01aison	(2014)	and	Varotill	(2017).	
48Spira	and	Slinn	(2013).
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compliance’49	50		and		with		boilerplate		‘comply		or		explain’		statements.30		A		recent	
review		of		the		operation		of		the		Code		undertaken		by		accounting		firm		Grant		Thornton	
observed		that		full		compliance,		including		‘creative		compliance’,		with		the		Code		has	
been		in		the		region		of		50%.51		It		has		also		been		reported		that		explanations		are		rarely	
evaluated,		and		that		non-compliance		is		typically		not		followed		by		a		clear		market	
response.52		Similar		responses		have		been		reported		from		India.53		We		may		argue,	
then,		that		the		adoption		of		the		principles		behind		the		UK		Code		model		of		regulation	
has		resulted		in		‘weak		monitoring		and		enforcement		mechanisms’54		and		has		not	
managed		to		restore		the		broad		public		confidence		in		boards,		accountants,		or		private	
market		actors		in		the		way		that		it		was		envisaged		by		the		authors		of		the		Cadbury		Report	
and		the		subsequent		iterations		of		the		UK		Code.	
	
	
3.2.1		Political		Economy	
	
The		empirical		problems		with		the		UK		Code		are		compounded		by		its		broader		embed-	
ding		of		a		very		specific		idea		of		political		economy		in		corporate		governance.		The		UK	
Code		presents		corporate		governance		as		an		exclusive		dyadic		relation		between		two	
constituencies:		owners		(shareholders)		and		senior		executives		(board		of		directors).		In	
this		reduced		dyadic		conception		of		core		constituencies,		serving		the		shareholders	
becomes		central		to		the		purpose		assigned		to		boards,		and		concepts		of		accountability,	
transparency,		compliance,		and		disclosure		become		directed		exclusively		toward		these	
two		constituencies.55	
This		limited		framing		of		corporate		governance		for		Public		Limited		Companies	
(PLCs)		is		problematic		in		relation		to		a		broader		concept		of		the		legitimation		of		PLCs,	
and		its		outcomes		in		terms		of		political		economy		in		the		economies		in		which		they	
operate.56		More		specifically,		this		limited		framing		is		problematic		in		relation		to		the	
UK		Code’s		conceptions		of		self-regulation.		The		UK		Code		legitimises		self-regulation	
at		least		in		part		on		the		basis		of		an		appeal		to		‘enlightened		shareholder		value’		in		boards	
and		executives,		and		‘stewardship’		by		market		parties		(notably		institutional		investors)	
as		a		safeguard		for		broader		interests,		such		as		a		long-term		perspective		on		the		firm		and	
its		operations,		and		the		interests		of		other		stakeholders.		However,		as		the		Code		imparts	
a		clear		shareholder		value-oriented		notion		of		corporate		governance,		not		just		in		its	
basic		assumptions		about		monitoring		and		accountability,		but		also		in		its		institution	
and		operation,		the		UK		Code		consistently		directs		shareholders,		boards,		and	
	
	
49Spira	and	Slinn	(2013),	pp.	190-191.	
50Aguilera	and	Cuervo-Cazurra	(2009),	Arcot	et	al.	(2010),	Keay	(2014),	Spira	and	Slinn	(2013).	
5'Grant	Thornton	(2013).	
52Aguilera	and	Cuervo-Cazurra	(2009)	and	Keay	(2014).	
53Varotill	(2017).	
54Aguilera	and	Cuervo-Cazurra	(2009),	p.	383.	
55Blair	(1995),	Gospel	and	Pendleton	(2003),	Horn	(2012),	Parkinson	(2003)	and	Tsuk	(2003).	
56See	www.themodemcorporation.com	for	a	broad	academic	project	on	these	topics.
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executives		to		run		companies		for		the		production		of		shareholder		value,		while		obscur-	
ing		the		role		of		long-term		perspectives		and		broader		stakeholders		interests		in		the	
exercise		of		corporate		governance.57	
	
	
3.2.2		Shareholder		Value		and		Stewardship	
	
An		example		of		the		limited		uptake		of		such		broader		perspectives		and		interests		is	
provided		by		the		way		institutional		investors		relate		to		calls		for		stewardship.		In		the		UK	
Code,		shareholders		are		the		main		providers		of		adequate		oversight		and		compliance.	
As		Varottil		argues,		‘the		“comply		or		explain”		approach		works		only		if		shareholders	
shed		their		passive		stance		and		take		on		a		more		active		role		in		companies		based		on	
disclosures		made		by		them		regarding		compliance		(or		otherwise)		with		the		corporate	
governance		norms.’.58‘Enlightened		shareholder		value’		is		invoked		to		coax		share-	
holders		to		work		with		a		long-term		view		toward		companies.		In		the		case		of		institu-	
tional		investors,		the		FRC		has		produced		a		‘Stewardship		Code’		aimed		at		pension	
funds		and		other		institutional		investors		to		emphasise		that		adopting		a		longer-term	
perspective		and		the		interests		of		broader		groups		of		constituencies—notably		by	
aligning		with		the		broader		interests		of		their		end		beneficiaries—promotes		the		long-	
term		success		of		companies		‘in		such		a		way		that		the		ultimate		providers		of		capital		also	
prosper’		and,		thereby,		will		benefit		‘companies,		investors		and		the		economy		as		a	
whole’.59		The		notion		of		‘stewardship’		is		thus		a		more		specific		notion		of		‘enlightened	
shareholder		value’,		which		focuses		on		the		capacity		of		institutional		investors		to	
monitor		boards		and		to		coax		them		through		their		market		positions		and		through		direct	
engagement		to		improve		long-term,		risk-adjusted		returns		to		shareholders		and		to	
address		the		broader		short-termist		tendencies		of		markets		and		boards		alike.60	
However,		the		concept		of		‘stewardship’		works		on		the		basis		of		a		number		of	
problematic		premises.		For		instance,		to		make		‘stewardship’		work,		institutional	
investors		need		to		be		able		to		operate		as		a		relatively		tight		and		coordinated		front,	
with		clear		and		coordinated		goals.		However,		in		the		UK		in		2012		institutional		inves-	
tors		held		only		41%		of		shares		while		foreign		investors		also		held		41%		of		shares.61	
Foreign		investors		may		be		assumed		to		be		not		very		interested		to		work		together		with	
local		investors,		and		more		interested		in		a		direct		return		on		investment		(ROI)		and		will	
engage		less		with		boards		on		long-term		outcomes.	
Another		problematic		premise		is		the		idea		that		institutional		investors		would	
operate		in		the		interests		of		end		beneficiaries.		Although		the		Myners		Report		(2001)	
found		that		a		misalignment		between		asset		managers’		incentives		and		end	
	
	
	
57See	Veldman	and	Willmott	(2016).	
58Varotill	(2017).	
59FRC	(2012),	p.	1.	
“See	Cheffins	(2013)	and	De	Graaf	and	Williams	(2011).	
6IUK	Office	for	National	Statistics	(2012),	p.	3.
	 87	
	
beneficiaries’		interests		could		provide		a		problem		in		the		provision		of		‘stewardship’,		it	
has		since		been		argued		that		the		practical		diversity		of		interests		in		end		beneficiaries,	
and		the		fact		that		these		interests		can		shift		over		time,		makes		the		imposition		of	
presumed		shared		interests,		other		than		financial		ones,		very		complicated.62		Melis	
(2014)		finds		that		institutional		investors		identify		their		relative		financial		performance	
as		their		primary		interest,		while		Calpers,		a		major		Californian		pension		fund,		virtually	
invented		the		concept		of		shareholder		value,		even		as		it		was		explicitly		acknowledged	
that		this		goal		could		harm		the		interests		of		its		own		end		beneficiaries.63	
Another		issue		is		that		institutional		investors		are		not		always		free		to		choose		their	
investment		strategy.		They		have		to		be		wary		of		the		role		of		rating		agencies,		who		use		a	
limited		set		of		benchmarks		to		evaluate		their		performance.		Similarly,		insurers—	
including		those		who		insure		board		members’		liabilities—apply		a		limited		set		of	
benchmarks		to		assess		adequate		strategy		setting.		Under		these		conditions,		it		is		not	
surprising		that		the		Kay		Review64		noted		that		asset		managers		working		for		institu-	
tional		investors		typically		have		a		‘short		performance		horizon’.		Moreover,		institu-	
tional		investors		gain		advice		on		engaging		with		corporate		strategy		from		a		very		limited	
set		of		proxy		advisers,		who		have		specific		ideas		about		how		to		use		their		considerable	
proxy		voting		rights.65		Finally,		shares		are		often		held		in		and		traded		by		intermediaries,	
who		also		operate		under		conditions		in		which		they		need		to		produce		ROI.	
There		is,		then,		a		mutually		reinforcing		relation		between		an		institutional		setting	
that		clearly		prioritizes		shareholder		value,		and		the		directedness		of		(institutional)	
investors		toward		the		market,		rather		than		the		firm.		Under		these		conditions,		the		belief	
in		the		willingness		and		capacity		of		(institutional)		shareholders		to		act		as	
old-fashioned		quasi-owners66		who		can		and		will		provide		effective		oversight		and	
control		for		the		benefit		of		(long-term)		interests		of		companies		and		other		constituen-	
cies67;		who		can		and		will		retain		their		long-term		liabilities		were		other		investors		would	
not68;		and		who		will		not		apply		pressure		on		corporate		boards		to		serve		their		own		short-	
term		interests,		even		if		other		might		do		so		to		engage		in		free-riding		behaviour		at		their	
cost,		seems		a		rather		romantic		and		misplaced		idea.	
As		a		regulatory		framework		that		appeals		to		self-regulation		will		in		practice		orient	
the		objective		of		the		company		and		its		control,		and		the		objective		of		the		monitoring		by	
market-based		parties		directly		toward		the		creation		of		shareholder		value,		the		notional	
appeal		to		‘enlightened		shareholder		value’		and		‘stewardship’		will		become		subsumed	
by		the		overriding		political		economy		presented		by		the		Code.69		In		turn,		a		shareholder	
value-oriented		compass		for		corporate		governance		creates		a		set		of		institutional	
	
	
62Archer	(2011)	and	Mayer	(2013).	
63Archer	(2011).	
64Kay	Review	(2012),	5.18.	
65Johnson	and	Millon	(2005).	
66See	Johnston	and	Morrow	(2015).	
67See	Millon	(2013).	
68See	Tsagas	(2014).	
69For	a	broader	discussion,	see	Veldman	and	Willmott	(2016).
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conditions		that		makes		it		largely		illusory		to		rely		on		market		parties		like		institutional	
investors		to		provide		adequate		protection		for		other		constituencies’		interests		or		to	
provide		a		long-term		perspective		to		companies.70	
As		such,		the		UK		Code		exports		a		model		for		self-regulation		into		corporate	
governance		codes		worldwide		based		on		highly		specific		notions		of		political		economy,	
which		stacks		the		odds		against		a		long-term		perspective		on		corporations		and		the	
inclusion		of		broader		constituencies’		interests.		It		is		noteworthy		that		this		approach		to	
regulation		and		to		political		economy		is		not		fundamentally		questioned,		even		in		the	
face		of		quite		overwhelming		empirical		problems,		including		non-compliance		by	
companies,		lack		of		adequate		monitoring		by		market		actors,		and		corporate		gover-	
nance		crises		of		increasing		severity.71	
	
	
3.3	 Transnational		Domain		and		TNC	
	
The		reported		theoretical		and		empirical		problems		provide		reasons		to		wonder		whether	
business		and		regulatory		elites		are		de		facto		capable		of		providing		informal		enforce-	
ment		through		suasion		in		the		UK		itself.		I		have		also		illustrated		why		a		reliance		on	
informal		enforcement		may		be		even		more		problematic		in		relation		to		the		spread		of	
Codes		internationally.		I		now		add		a		final		concern,		which		is		the		spread		of		the	
assumptions		behind		the		UK		Code		in		relation		to		the		transnational		corporation	
(TNC).72	
Ideas		of		regulation,		whether		self-regulation		and		principles-based,		or		‘hard		law’	
and		rules-based,		are		typically		built		on		the		assumption		that		a		state		can		control		and	
regulate		a		clearly		defined		business		entity.		In		this		framing,		the		object		for		self-	
regulation,		also		in		the		UK		Code,		is		typically		conceptualised		as		a		singular		entity,	
operating		in		one		jurisdiction.		When		these		assumptions		are		spread		into		codes		around	
the		world,		however,		they		come		to		permeate		regulatory		assumptions		that		apply		not	
just		to		jurisdictionally		constrained		singular		‘entities’,		but		also		to		the		corporate	
group,		commonly		understood		as		a		TNC.	
Arguably,		the		emergence		of		the		TNC		has		enabled		an		enormous		turnaround		of		the	
organisation		of		the		worldwide		economy		and		a		move		toward		transnational		organi-	
sation		of		global		value		chains.		However,		the		TNC		continues		to		operate		as		a		very	
	
	
	
	
'°See	also	Arcot	et	al.	(2010),	Mayer	(2013)	and	Tsagas	(2014).	
7'Veldman	and	Willmott	(2016).	
72TNC:	‘a	multinational	or	transnational	corporation	refers	to	a	firm	with	subsidiaries	located	in	
two	or	more	countries.	The	subsidiaries	of	a	transnational	corporation,	moreover,	are	generally	
involved	in	production	or	in	an	economic	activity	(...)	The	structure	and	operations	of	the	
transnational	or	multinational	corporation,	however,	do	foster	a	global	perspective	within	the	
enterprise	in	the	sense	that	decisions	are	made	from	the	standpoint	of	the	corporation’s	global	
activities	and	needs.’	Bowman	(1993),	p.	61.
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poorly		theorised		legal		and		economic		construct.		As		Robe		has		argued,		TNCs		are		not	
corporations,		because		they		do		not		exist		as		coherent		‘entities’.73		Corporate		groups	
consist		of		separate		legal		entities,		which		all		hold		their		own		separate		attributions		of	
agency,		ownership,		and		rights,		and		which		are		all		endowed		with		limited		liability.		As	
the		TNC		is		only		recognized		as		a		group		of		separate		national		companies		established	
under		the		laws		of		different		countries,		it		is		not		an		integrated		entity		and		cannot		be	
addressed		as		such		under		international		law.74		These		corporate		groups		without		a		clear	
conceptual		status		operate		in		a		transnational		domain		where		states		have		no		direct	
jurisdiction		and		limited		capacity		to		regulate.75		The		law		applicable		to		subsidiaries		is	
generally		the		law		of		the		jurisdiction		in		which		that		‘entity’		has		been		set		up.		As		a	
result,		the		attribution		of		legal		responsibility		or		liability		has		to		be		established		with	
the		help		of		collections		of		entities,		constituted		in		different		jurisdictions		and		set		up		for	
various		purposes.76		These		issues		spread		into		corporate		governance		arrangements.	
As		fiduciary		duties		for		directors		extend		to		subsidiaries,		rather		than		to		the		group,		the	
question		is		how		board		duties		relate		between		entities		in		corporate		groups.77		More-	
over,		as		neither		the		country		of		incorporation		nor		the		country		where		the		holding	
company		is		based		can		be		designated		as		the		exclusive		‘seat’		of		the		corporation78		it		is	
‘...		hard		even		to		identify		to		which		country		multinationals		‘belong’.79		For		these	
reasons,		it		has		been		observed		by		some		that		the		gradual		spread		of		the		TNC		from	
the		1950s		onwards		necessitates		the		introduction		of		a		new		transnational		framework	
for		regulation.80	
However,		rather		than		a		comprehensive		regulatory		framework		under		the		auspices	
of		citizens		and		states,		the		production		of		international		corporate		governance		codes	
and		regulations		that		apply		to		the		transnational		domain		are		typically		produced		by	
	
	
73‘Any	legal	analysis	of	the	enterprise	comes	up	against	this	irritating	fact:	although	the	enterprise	
is	perceived	in	economic	and	social	life	as	a	unit,	positive	law	is	not	in	a	position	to	assemble	its	
various	components	in	a	unitary	construction.’	Robe	(1997),	p.	52.	
74In	a	transnational	domain	‘...	only	states	and	individuals	are	currently	considered	to	be	subject	
to	international	law,	conventions	and	jurisdictions.’	Queinnec	and	Bourdon	(2010),	p.	57.	
75Abbott	and	Snidal	(2000)	and	Veldman	(2013).	
76See	Hansen	and	Aranda	(1990),	Morgan	(2008);	The	multiplicity	of	assumptions	at	play	in	
relation	to	the	TNC	can	be	used	to	'...		 choose	among	various	legal	systems,	applying	economic	
criteria	to	their	choice	of	which	set	of	labor,	social,	and	environmental	regulations	they	will	
operate	under’	(Scherer	and	Palazzo	2007,	p.	1101),	and	to	evade	‘.	.	.	the	regulatory	claims	of	
national	and	international	law’	(Teubner	1997,	p.	770).	As	a	result,	the	TNC	can	be	used	to	
construct	special	purpose	vehicles,	defensive	asset	partitioning,	and	transfer	pricing	that	enable	the	
containment	of	legal	and	financial	liabilities.	This	facilitates	the	division	of	liabilities	and	assets	in	
separate	legal	‘entities’,	the	routing	of	financial	streams	through	particular	tax	regimes,	and	the	
sheltering	of	wealth	in	tax	havens,	the	continuing	evasion	of	criminal	liability	and	taxes;	and	
provides	the	conceptual	means	for	regulatory	evasion	and	arbitrage	(see	Jones	and	Haigh	2007;	
Palan	et	al.	2010;	van	Oosterhout	2010;	Robe	2011;	Wilks	2013).	
,7See	Keay	and	Loughrey	(2015).	
78Dine	(2006).	
79Avi-Yonah	(2011)	and	Scott	(1981).	
80Hansen	and	Aranda	(1990)	and	Macleod	and	Lewis	(2005).
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private		industry		and		professional		associations.81		As		these		often		include		the		very	
TNCs		that		are		the		object		of		these		governance		codes82		such		codes		are		typically	
conducive		to		the		adoption		of		norms		and		institutions		conforming		to		the		interests	
of		enterprises’83		and		aim		at		self-regulation.84	85		Devolving		state		powers		to		regulatory	
‘agents’		like		NAFTA,		ASEAN,		IMF,		and		the		World		Bank,		which		chain		nation	
states		to		supra-national		regulatory		principles,		makes		this		situation		even		more	
problematic.83		In		the		absence		of		both		a		clear		conceptualisation		of		the		corporate	
group		and		a		clear		transnational		framework		for		the		regulation		of		TNCs,		the		adoption	
of		self-regulatory		regimes		in		jurisdictions		worldwide		seems		to		create		an		account-	
ability		gap.86	
	
	
4	 Discussion		and		Conclusions	
	
I		have		explored		the		role		of		the		UK		Code		as		a		prime		example		of		‘soft		law’		and		found	
that		the		architects		of		the		Code		provided		a		nominally		private		Code		that		endorsed		an	
explicitly		voluntaristic		framework		for		regulation		in		the		hope		to		forestall		calls		for	
mandatory		regulation		and		provide		a		re-legitimation		of		self-regulation		and		market-	
led		monitoring.87		The		spread		of		these		assumptions		of		self-regulation		into		interna-	
tional		Codes		seems		problematic		for		four		reasons:	
Firstly,		in		the		functioning		of		the		Code		regulation		is		not		absent,		but		rather	
becomes		implicit		as		the		capacity		of		elite		actors		to		provide		suasion		behind		the		scenes	
becomes		the		primary		means		for		enforcement.		Implementing		self-regulatory		codes	
of		corporate		governance		in		other		jurisdictions		without		embedding		such		codes		in		this	
implicit		institutional		background		misrepresents		the		locus		and		capacity		for		regula-	
tion.		The		potential		issues		with		this		misrepresentation		will		become		exacerbated		in	
jurisdictions		that		lack		sufficiently		strong		regulatory		institutions		of		an		explicit		or	
implicit		nature.		The		potential		issues		will		also		become		exacerbated		if		exported		to	
jurisdictions		that		have		different		ownership		and		control		mechanisms,		where		the		push	
toward		self-regulation		may		effectively		be		counterproductive		in		terms		of		producing	
more		monitoring		and		transparency.		In		both		respects,		it		is		worthwhile		to		consider		the	
specificity		of		jurisdictional		contexts		before		considering		the		UK		Code		an		example		of	
‘best		practice’		in		the		development		of		corporate		governance		codes.	
Secondly,		and		in		relation		to		this		institutional		background,		a		substantial		number	
of		empirical		problems		with		the		operation		of		the		UK		Code		seems		to		be		recognized	
	
	
8‘Morgan	(2008).	
82van	Oosterhout	(2010),	p.	257.	
83Robe	(1997),	p.	71.	
84Crane	and	Matten	(2005)	and	Scherer	and	Palazzo	(2007).	
85Robe	(1997),	p.	62.	
86Jones	and	Haigh	(2007),	McLean	(2004)	and	Veldman	(2013).	
87See	Henry	(2008),	Parkinson	(2000),	Parkinson	and	Kelly	(1999)	and	Pye	(2013).
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but		left		unaddressed.		The		apparent		failure		by		regulatory		elites		to		produce		enough	
‘suasion’		to		convince		business		elites		to		address		consistent		empirical		failings		and	
non-compliance		with		respect		to		the		comply		or		explain		regime,		but		also		to		exercise	
sufficient		self-constraint		in		the		face		of		major		irritants		to		the		broader		public		like	
rising		executive		pay,88		seems		to		indicate		a		failure		of		the		capacity		for		effective	
informal		behind-the-scenes		pressure		that		was		the		basis		for		the		adoption		of		a		self-	
regulatory		regime.		The		importance		of		a		failure		to		provide		effective		suasion		was		well	
recognized		by		Cadbury,		who		repeatedly		warned		that		the		failure		of		regulatory		and	
business		elites		to		comply		with		the		Code,		would		eventually		invite		consideration		of	
stronger		interventions		and		mandatory		regulation		by		regulatory		authorities.89		It		was	
well		understood		at		the		time		the		Cadbury		Report		was		presented		that		hard		law,		direct	
intervention		by		regulators,		and		potentially		even		calls		for		nationalisation		were		the	
elephants		in		the		room		that		would		not		be		addressed		in		the		discourse		and		practice		of	
the		UK		Code,		in		exchange		for		the		unmitigated		active		adoption		of		the		‘spirit’		of		the	
‘comply		or		explain’		regime		and		its		unspoken		assumptions		by		business		elites.90	
Thirdly,		the		UK		Code		projects		a		restricted		notion		of		corporate		purpose		subsumed	
under		the		political		economy		of		shareholder		value,		which		limits		concepts		of		account-	
ability,		transparency,		compliance,		and		disclosure		to		a		reduced		dyadic		conception		of	
core		constituencies		and		the		object		of		monitoring		to		the		production		of		market		value.	
In		this		institutional		setting		appeals		to		self-regulation		will		in		practice		orient		the	
objective		of		the		company		and		its		control		exclusively		toward		the		creation		of		share-	
holder		value,		while		appeals		to		monitoring		by		market-based		parties		directly		on		the	
basis		of		ideas		like		‘enlightened		shareholder		value’		and		‘stewardship’		will		similarly	
remain		subsumed		by		the		overriding		political		economy		that		is		endorsed		by		the		Code.	
The		shareholder		value-oriented		compass		for		corporate		governance		adopted		by		the	
UK		Code		thus		creates		a		set		of		institutional		conditions		that		makes		it		largely		illusory	
to		rely		on		boards		or		market		agents		to		provide		adequate		protection		for		other	
constituencies’		interests		or		to		provide		a		long-term		perspective		to		companies.		As	
such,		the		UK		Code		exports		a		model		for		self-regulation		into		corporate		governance	
codes		worldwide		based		on		highly		specific		notions		of		political		economy,		which	
stacks		the		odds		against		a		long-term		perspective		on		corporations		and		the		inclusion	
of		broader		constituencies’		interests.	
Fourthly,		the		unclear		legal		status		of		the		TNC,		especially		with		regard		to		its		legal	
status		in		a		transnational		domain		leaves		states		with		little		or		no		means		to		regulate		such	
‘entities’.91		Applying		assumptions		of		self-regulation		beyond		the		clear		and		confined	
context		of		a		single		jurisdiction		like		the		UK		and		effectively		applying		these		assump-	
tions		toward		TNCs		in		their		capacity		as		corporate		groups		further		complicates		the	
	
	
	
88See	Cadbury	(2002)	and	Tricker	(2015).	
89Cadbury	(2002)	and	Spira	and	Slinn	(2013).	
90See	Arcot	and	Bruno	(2006),	Bowden	(2000),	Cadbury	(2002),	Cadbury	Report	(1992),	1.10;	
Spira	and	Slinn	(2013).	
9‘Murphy	and	Ackroyd	(2013),	Robe	(1997)	and	Veldman	(2013).
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basis		for		the		development		and		application		of		regulation		for		entities		that		operate		in	
the		transnational		domain.	
Overall,		the		use		of		the		UK		Code		as		a		model		for		corporate		governance		codes	
internationally		should		be		scrutinized		for		four		main		reasons.		Firstly,		the		UK		Code	
relies		on		highly		specific		implicit		assumptions		about		the		institutional		framing		that	
governs		corporate		governance		arrangements,		and		notably		the		capacity		for		control.	
In		this		respect,		the		specific		political		and		control		conditions		that		govern		corporate	
governance		arrangements		in		other		jurisdictions		should		be		considered		carefully	
before		adopting		the		assumptions		of		the		UK		Code		as		‘best		practice’.		Secondly,		the	
UK		Code		implicitly		relies		on		active		compliance		by		business		actors,		diligent		mon-	
itoring		by		capital		market		actors,		and		effective		suasion		by		regulatory		actors.		How-	
ever,		these		actors		fail		to		effectively		address		ongoing		non-compliance,		ignoring		the	
‘spirit’		that		allowed		for		a		self-regulatory		code.		Thirdly,		the		UK		Code		entrenches		a	
notion		of		political		economy		that		projects		a		problematic		compass		for		corporate	
control		and		monitoring.		Finally,		applying		self-regulation		beyond		the		clear		and	
confined		context		of		a		single		jurisdiction		and		toward		the		regulation		of		entities		that	
operate		in		the		transnational		domain		undermines		the		capacity		for		states		to		regulate	
such		transnational		entities.	
For		these		reasons,		it		may		be		considered		that		reliance		on		self-regulation,		princi-	
ples-based		regulation,		or		‘soft		law’		may		have		some		beneficial		outcomes,92		but		that	
these		ideas		of		corporate		governance		and		regulation		need		to		be		contextualised		in	
relation		to		the		effectiveness		of		the		institutional		structures		that		shape		and		sustain		the	
global		political		economy.	
	
	
References	
	
Abbott	KW,	Snidal	D	(2000)	Hard	and	soft	law	in	international	governance.	Int	Organ	54	
(3):421—456	
Aglietta	M,	Reberioux	A	(2005)	Corporate	governance	adrift:	a	critique	of	shareholder	value.	
Edward	Elgar	Publishing,	Cheltenham	
Aguilera	RV,	Cuervo-Cazurra	A	(2004)	Codes	of	good	governance	worldwide:	what	is	the	trigger?	
Organ	Stud	25(3):415^t43	
Aguilera	RV,	Cuervo-Cazurra	A	(2009)	Codes	of	good	governance.	Corp	Gov	Int	Rev	17	
(3):376—387	
Andres	C,	Theissen	E	(2008)	Setting	a	fox	to	keep	the	geese—does	the	comply-or-explain	
principle	work?	J	Corp	Finan	14(3):289—301	
Anonymous	(1992)	Committee	on	the	financial	aspects	of	corporate	governance	(Cadbury	Report),	
pp	1-53	
Anonymous	(1998)	Committee	on	Corporate	Governance;	Final	report	(Hampel	Report).	London	
Stock	Exchange,	London,	pp	1-66	
Archer	S	(2011)	Pension	funds	as	owners	and	as	financial	intermediaries:	a	review	of	recent	
Canadian	experience.	In:	Williams	CA,	Zumbansen	P	(eds)	The	embedded	firm:	corporate	
	
	
92Abbott	and	Snidal	(2000).
	 93	
	
governance,	 labor,	 and	 finance	 capitalism.	Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 Cambridge,	 pp	
177-204	
Arcot	S,	Bruno	V	(2006)	In	letter	but	not	in	spirit:	an	analysis	of	corporate	governance	in	the	
UK.	Available	at	SSRN	819784	
Arcot	S,	Bruno	V,	Faure-Grimaud	A	(2010)	Corporate	governance	in	the	UK:	is	the	comply	or	
explain	approach	working?	Int	Rev	Law	Econ	30(2):	193-201	
Armour	J	(2008)	Enforcement	strategies	in	UK	corporate	governance:	a	roadmap	and	empirical	
assessment.	ECGI-Law	Working	Paper	(106)	
Armour	J,	Black	B,	Cheffins	B	(2009)	Private	enforcement	of	corporate	law:	an	empirical	
comparison	of	the	United	Kingdom	and	the	United	States.	J	Empir	Leg	Stud	6(4):687-722	
Avi-Yonah	RS	(2011)	Citizens	united	and	the	corporate	form.	Account	Econ	Law	1	(3):	1—54	
Blair	MM	(1995)	Ownership	and	control:	rethinking	corporate	governance	for	the	twenty-first	
century.	Brookings	Institution	Press,	Washington	
Bowden	S	(2000)	Corporate	governance	in	a	political	climate:	the	impact	of	public	policy	regimes	
on	corporate	governance	in	the	UK.	In:	Parkinson	JE,	Gamble	A,	Kelly	G	(eds)	The	political	
economy	of	the	company.	Hart	Publishing,	Oxford,	pp	175-194	
Bowman	SR	(1993)	The	ideology	of	transnational	enterprise.	Soc	Sci	J	30(l):47-68	
Cadbury	A	(2002)	Corporate	governance	and	chairmanship:	a	personal	view.	Oxford	University	
Press,	Oxford	
Cheffins	BR	(2013)	The	history	of	corporate	governance.	In:	Wright	M,	Siegel	DS,	Keasey	K	et	al	
(eds)	The	Oxford	handbook	of	corporate	governance.	Oxford	University	Press,	Oxford	
Crane	A,	Matten	D	(2005)	Corporate	citizenship:	missing	the	point	or	missing	the	boat?	A	reply	to	
van	Oosterhout.	Acad	Manag	Rev	30:681-684	
De	Graaf	FJ,	Williams	CA	(2011)	The	intellectual	foundations	of	the	global	financial	crisis:	
analysis	and	proposals	for	reform.	In:	Williams	CA,	Zumbansen	P	(eds)	The	embedded	firm:	
corporate	governance,	labor,	and	finance	capitalism.	CUP,	Cambridge,	pp	383-412	
Dine	J	(2006)	The	governance	of	corporate	groups.	CUP,	Cambridge	
Financial	Reporting	Council	(2012)	The	UK	Corporate	Governance	Code,	pp	1-34	
Gospel	H,	Pendleton	A	(2003)	Finance,	corporate	governance	and	the	management	of	labour:	a	
conceptual	and	comparative	analysis.	Br	J	Ind	Relat	41(3):557—582	
Grant	Thornton	(2013)	Corporate	Governance	Review	2013	
Hansen	P,	Aranda	V	(1990)	Emerging	international	framework	for	transnational	corporations.	
Fordham	Int	Law	J	14:881	
Henry	A	(2008)	Understanding	strategic	management.	OUP,	Oxford	
Horn	L	(2012)	Corporate	governance	in	crisis?	The	politics	of	EU	corporate	governance	regula-	
tion.	Eur	Law	J	18(1):83-107	
Ireland	P	(2005)	Shareholder	primacy	and	the	distribution	of	wealth.	Mod	Law	Rev	68(1):49—81.	
doi:	10.1111/j.	1468-2230.2005,00528.x	
Jansson	A,	et	al	(2016)	Editorial:	the	political	economy	of	corporate	governance.	Ephemera	16	
(1):	1—17	
Johnson	LP,	Millon	D	(2005)	Recalling	why	corporate	officers	are	fiduciaries.	William	Mary	Law	
Rev	46(5):	1597-1653	
Johnston	A,	Morrow	P	(2015)	Towards	long-termism	in	corporate	governance:	the	shareholder	
rights	directive	and	beyond.	In:	Vitols	S	(ed)	Long-term	investment	and	the	Sustainable	
Company:	a	stakeholder	perspective.	ETUI,	Brussels	
Jones	MT,	Haigh	M	(2007)	The	transnational	corporation	and	new	corporate	citizenship	theory:	a	
critical	analysis.	J	Corp	Citiz	27:51-69	
Jones	V,	Pierce	C	(2013)	Corporate	governance	in	the	United	Kingdom.	Global	governance	
services.	Orpington,	Kent	
Jones	I,	Pollitt	M	(2004)	Understanding	how	issues	in	corporate	governance	develop:	Cadbury	
Report	to	Higgs	review.	Corp	Gov	Int	Rev	12(2):	162-171	
Jordan	C	(2013)	Cadbury	twenty	years	on.	Villanova	Law	Rev	58(	1):	1—24
94	 	
	
Kay	J	(2012)	The	Kay	review	of	UK	equity	markets	and	long-term	decision	making.	Final	Report,	
p	112	
Keay	A	(2014)	Comply	or	explain	in	corporate	governance	codes:	in	need	of	greater	regulatory	
oversight?	Leg	Stud	34(2):279-304.	doi:	10.1111/lest.	12014	
Keay	A,	Loughrey	J	(2015)	The	framework	for	board	accountability	in	corporate	governance.	Leg	
Stud	35(2):252—279	
Larsson-Olaison	U	(2014)	Convergence	of	national	corporate	governance	systems:	localizing	and	
fitting	the	transplants.	Linnaeus	University	Press,	Vaxjo	
Macleod	S,	Lewis	D	(2004)	Transnational	corporations	power,	influence	and	responsibility.	Glob	
Soc	Policy	4(1):77—98	
Mayer	C	(2013)	Firm	commitment:	why	the	corporation	is	failing	us	and	how	to	restore	trust	in	
it.	Oxford	University	Press,	Oxford	
McLean	J	(2004)	Transnational	corporation	in	history:	lessons	for	today.	Indiana	Law	J	79	
(2)	 :	363-377	
Melis	DA	(2014)	The	Institutional	Investor	Stewardship	Myth:	A	Theoretical,	Legal	and	Empirical	
Analysis	of	Prescribed	Institutional	Investor	Stewardship	in	a	Dutch	Context.	Legal	and	
Empirical	Analysis	of	Prescribed	Institutional	Investor	Stewardship	in	a	Dutch	Context	(June	
4,	2014)	
Millon	D	(2013)	Shareholder	social	responsibility.	Seattle	Univ	Law	Rev	36:911-940	
Morgan	G	(2008)	Market	formation	and	governance	in	international	financial	markets:	the	case	of	
OTC	derivatives'.	Hum	Relat	61(5):637-660	
Murphy	J,	Ackroyd	S	(2013)	Transnational	corporations,	socio-economic	change	and	recurrent	
crisis.	Crit	Perspect	Int	Bus	9(4):336—57	
Overbeek	H,	Van	Apeldoom	B,	Nolke	A	(2007)	The	transnational	politics	of	corporate	governance	
regulation.	Routledge,	New	York	
Palan	R,	Murphy	R,	Chavagneux	C	(2010)	Tax	havens:	how	globalization	really	works.	Cornell	
University	Press,	Ithaca,	New	York	
Parkinson	J	(2000)	Evolution	and	policy	in	company	law:	the	non-executive	director.	In:	
Parkinson	JE,	Gamble	A,	Kelly	G	(eds)	The	political	economy	of	the	company.	Hart	Publish-	
ing,	Oxford,	pp	233-263	
Parkinson	J	(2003)	Models	of	the	company	and	the	employment	relationship.	Br	J	Ind	Relat	41	
(3)	 :481-509	
Parkinson	J,	Kelly	G	(1999)	The	combined	code	on	corporate	governance.	Polit	Q	70(1):	101—107	
Pye	A	(2013)	Boards	and	governance:	25	years	of	qualitative	research	with	directors	of	FTSE	
companies.	In:	Wright	M,	Siegel	DS,	Keasey	K	et	al	(eds)	The	Oxford	handbook	of	corporate	
governance.	Oxford	University	Press,	Oxford,	pp	135-162	
Queinnec	Y,	Bourdon	W	(2010)	Regulating	transnational	companies:	46	proposals	
Robe	JP	(1997)	Multinational	enterprises:	the	constitution	of	a	pluralistic	legal	order.	In:	Teubner	
G	(ed)	Global	law	without	a	state.	Dartmouth,	Aldershot,	pp	45-78	
Robe	JP	(2011)	The	legal	structure	of	the	firm.	Account	Econ	Law	1(1):	1-86	
Roberts	J	(2012)	Between	the	letter	and	the	spirit:	defensive	and	extensive	modes	of	compliance	
with	the	UK	code	of	corporate	governance.	In:	Clarke	T,	Branson	D	(eds)	The	SAGE	handbook	
of	corporate	governance	SAGE,	London,	pp	196-217	
Scherer	AG,	Palazzo	G	(2007)	Toward	a	political	conception	of	corporate	responsibility:	business	
and	society	seen	from	a	Habermasian	perspective.	Acad	Manag	Rev	32(4):	1096-1020	
Scott	J	(1981)	Corporations,	classes,	and	capitalism.	Hutchinson,	London	
Spira	LF,	Slinn	J	(2013)	The	Cadbury	committee:	a	history.	Oxford	University	Press,	Oxford	
Teubner	G	(1997)	The	king’s	many	bodies:	the	self-deconstruction	of	law’s	hierarchy.	Law	Soc	
Rev	31:763-788	
Tricker	RI	(2015)	Corporate	governance:	principles,	policies,	and	practices.	Oxford	University	
Press,	Oxford	
Tsagas	G	(2014)	A	long-term	vision	for	UK	firms?	Revisiting	the	target	director’s	advisory	role	
since	the	takeover	of	Cadbury’s	PLC.	J	Corp	Law	Stud	14(l):241-275
